Communication Breakdown: The Eisenhower Administration, Anthony Eden, and the Suez Crisis

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Following the Second World War (WWII), the world believed the United States and Great Britain had formed a bond that would dominate for decades. Yet not all was golden between the U.S. and Great Britain as they moved into 1956. President Dwight D. Eisenhower and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, attempted to gain influence in the Middle East and avoid a nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union; while British Prime Minister Anthony Eden struggled to keep the once great British Empire from completely crumbling in his hands. While both nations had interest in new Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser and Middle Eastern oil, they had opposing ideas on how to handle the situation. Eisenhower, Dulles, and Eden tried on three separate occasions to keep peace between Britain and Egypt, but all three times the U.S. left Britain in a terrible position. These letdowns caused Eden to become enraged with the U.S. and drove him into collusion with the French and Israelis, who were planning a violent attack of Egypt. After learning of British involvement in the attacks, Eisenhower felt betrayed by, supposedly, his closest ally, and commanded the United Nations-led intervention. Miscommunication and bitterness between Eisenhower, Eden,
and Dulles unintentionally concluded in the Suez Crisis.

In order to understand how the Anglo-American alliance deteriorated, it is important to look at what both leaders wanted before the crisis. President Eisenhower’s biggest goal while in office was to keep the U.S. from entering another war. After firsthand experience in WWII and watching the Korean War play out, Eisenhower wanted the U.S. to stay peaceful, and his biggest obstruction in all of this was the Soviet Union. Eisenhower feared that the Soviet Union would launch nuclear weapons, leading the U.S. to launch their own nuclear weapons, and ending in total destruction and fallout. After viewing NSC 5602/1, which showed what would happen during nuclear fallout between the Soviets and America, Eisenhower wrote in his diary:

[T]he United States experienced practically total economic collapse, which could not be restored to any kind of operative conditions under six months to a year. Members of the federal government were wiped out and a new government had to be improvised by the states. Casualties were enormous. It was calculated that something on the order of 65 percent of the population would require some kind of medical care and, in most instances, no opportunity whatsoever to get it. … While these things were going on, the damage inflicted by us against the Soviets was roughly three times greater. The picture of total destruction of the areas of lethal fallout, of serious fallout, and of at least some damage from fallout, was appalling. Under such an attack it would be completely impossible for Russia to carry a war on further.¹

This led him to try and keep the U.S. from entering any kind of nuclear war with the Soviets.\(^2\)

The worst case scenario for Eisenhower and Dulles was for the Soviet Union to move into the Middle East and influence the Arab nations to join their cause. While the U.S. had some diplomacy with the Arab nations, Eisenhower and Dulles felt they needed to strengthen their relations. They devised one path, at the insistence of Eisenhower’s pastor Edward L.R. Elson, which attempted to make a connection through religion. From the beginning of his administration, Eisenhower “made a deliberate effort to reach out to the Islamic world” in case a problem such as this ever arose.\(^3\) Eisenhower’s administration believed the U.S. could persuade the Arab nations to connect with them because of a shared belief in God, and fight against the Godless communists to keep them from spreading their views. Elson helped in more ways than just convincing Eisenhower, he was highly thought of in the Arab nations.\(^4\) He worked in the Middle East on several occasions, and Eisenhower felt his relationship with him would earn respect amongst the Arab nations. With both of these goals, Anthony Eden and British interests was nowhere to be found on the American radar.

While Eisenhower worried about war, the Arab nations and the Soviets, Eden had other issues to worry

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2 Before reading NSC 5602/1, Eisenhower and his administration had no problem threatening any country with the use of nuclear weapons. See Documents 1 and 2 of Chapter 8, “Dwight D. Eisenhower, Nikita Khrushchev, and Nuclear Arms,” in Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume II: Since 1914, 7th edition.


4 Ibid.
over. Eden’s popularity was not a high point before the crisis, especially with the press who called him a “ditherer;” but Eden could only worry about one issue, the crumbling British Empire. The empire was “disintegrating at an accelerated pace” following WWII, and “the process was far from over.”

Eden was born into the “empire when England was supreme around the globe,” which was ten days before Queen Victoria’s Diamond Jubilee, “a high point of the British empire.” He had only known the greatness of the British Empire, and witnessed how two destructive wars and a global rise of nationalism were putting the empire in jeopardy.

Eden hoped that if the British Empire did fall apart, it would not happen during his tenure as prime minister. Yet, there was a definite rise in resentment among the British about the sudden ascension of America around the world. As British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd said, “The Americans were, on the face of it, loyal and dependable allies but underneath there was … a pleased smile, only half concealed, at seeing us go down.”

Regardless of where they stood on the scale of global power, both Britain and the U.S. agreed on two issues, but disagreed on how to handle these issues. The first was the sudden rise of Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt. While the U.S. attempted to gain influence in the Middle East, Nasser

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7 Ibid.
8 Ibid., 19.
9 Quoted in Ibid.
rose to power and preached for Arab nations to unite. He wanted Egypt “in the forefront of the effort to create a global ‘third force’ that would be independent of the two Cold War blocs.”

Eisenhower and Dulles felt that in order to continue gaining ground in the Middle East; they must support Nasser, even if his motives were against theirs. They also attempted to persuade Nasser to join their side because of a recent weapons deal that had “caught Washington by surprise.”

The last thing Eisenhower and Dulles needed was for Nasser to fall into the arms of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, Eden and Britain wanted to remove Nasser from power. The Egyptians already resented the presence of British troops, and Nasser led the charge to remove them from the region.

Eden’s worst fear was for Nasser to nationalize the Suez Canal, which would be detrimental to not only the empire but Britain itself.

Oil security was the second issue the U.S. and Britain cared about, but could not come together on how to resolve the situation. If Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, Eden felt Egypt would be prejudice by not allowing British ships to use the canal to transport oil. Eden could not let this happen to British industries, which relied heavily upon oil from the Middle East to keep their businesses running. He felt he had to remove Nasser before any of these events were to transpire.

11 Ibid., 689.
12 Neff, 69.
14 Ibid.
The U.S., on the other hand, was interested in the oil of the Middle East, but they were nowhere near as interested as the British. While the U.S. was not dependent upon the Middle East to supply them with oil, “American oil companies already had a substantial and increasing share in the area’s oil production.” Ultimately, Eisenhower’s main interest in Middle Eastern oil revolved around the Soviet Union. If they were to become involved, possibly by influence of Nasser and his Arab nation following, they would have control over oil that was being used to assist in “economic recovery of Western Europe,” something Eisenhower attempted to avoid.

In the midst of discussion of these issues, an underlining tension existed between the two nations involving decolonization. The U.S. was “staking out its own self-interested position in the world, at times unavoidably at odds with Britain,” which helped hasten the decolonization process. On October 1, 1956, John Foster Dulles delivered a speech to the press regarding British colonialism, saying that the U.S. “cannot be expected to identify itself 100 percent ... with the colonial powers” involved with the Suez Crisis. Eden knew many Americans, including Eisenhower, shared Dulles’s opinions regarding British colonialism. In his memoirs, Eden wondered if the U.S. and the Eisenhower

16  Ibid.
17  Neff, 19.
administration would have acted any differently if the tables were turned, and the citizens of Panama led an uprising and threatened to nationalize the Panama Canal. With the tensions between the two nations beginning to rise, it only took a few incidents to sour Anglo-American relations. The drama involving the Baghdad Pact, the building of the Aswan Dam, and the misleading correspondence of the first London Conference eventually led Eden to feel exasperated, and exclude the Americans from his plans involving the Suez Canal.

In the early months of 1956, the U.S. and Britain were on the same page involving a pact to keep the Soviet Union from entering the Middle East. Eventually titled the Baghdad Pact, this agreement initially involved the U.S., Britain, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Turkey. Dulles decided to send the pact to Egypt in the hopes of getting Nasser to join their side. However, Nasser “balked at joining the pact, which he saw as an effort to perpetuate Western colonialism.” Once Dulles learned of Nasser’s opinion, he removed the U.S. from the pact and was “prepared to give it ‘moral support.’” This left Eden and Britain as the only western power involved and made Britain’s already unstable relations with Nasser and Egypt even worse. Eden was incensed at Dulles for the predicament he had placed Britain in, and for not explaining the U.S.’ sudden withdrawal from the pact in a face to face meeting. As Eden wrote in his memoirs, “In recent years the

19 Ibid., 557.
20 Smith, 687.
21 Eden, 374.
United States has sometimes failed to put its weight behind its friends in the hope of being popular with their foes. The practical consequences of this uncertain diplomacy are illustrated by United States treatment of the Baghdad Pact.”

What angered Eden even more was how the U.S. portrayed their role in the pact to representatives in Cairo, as if they had not been involved from the beginning.

The dealings of the Aswan Dam began a year before the actual Suez Crisis. In September of 1955, “Nasser formally announced the acquisition of Soviet arms from Czechoslovakia.” Following this acquisition, rumors circulated that Nasser was negotiating for the Russians to fund the building of the Aswan High Dam. At this point, Eisenhower and Dulles knew that if they wanted to remain friendly with the Arab nations and keep the Soviets out of the Middle East, they would have to outbid the Soviets in Egypt. They approached Britain and the World Bank in order to finance the construction of the dam and secretly tried to work a deal with “Egypt and Israel to come to terms with each other and live in peace.”

As Eisenhower wrote in his diary, Nasser immediately did two things that made him and Dulles question the deal:

(1) They sent back to us a whole list of conditions that

22 Ibid., 374-75.
23 Ibid., 375.
24 Smith, 689.
25 The Aswan High Dam was to be built further up the Nile from the original Aswan Dam. This new dam would control floods, provide water for irrigation, and generate electricity for Egypt’s rising industrialization.
26 Neff, 123.
would have to be met before they would go along with this plan, and some of these conditions were unacceptable. (2) They began to build up their military forces by taking over equipment provided by the Soviets, and they went to such an extent that we did not believe they would have a sufficient balance of resources left to do their part in building the dam. We lost interest and said nothing more about the matter.\textsuperscript{27}

Unfortunately, Eisenhower and Dulles did not consult Eden about ending the deal, misleading him for several weeks. On July 19, 1956, Dulles let the Egyptian ambassador know the deal was off and the loan from the World Bank expired, which was the first Eden heard of this. As Eden wrote, “We were sorry that the matter was carried through so abruptly because it gave our two countries no chance to concert either timing or methods.”\textsuperscript{28} One week later, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal in order to finance the construction of the Aswan High Dam.

Anthony Eden’s worst nightmare came true, and it arrived, inadvertently, at the hands of Eisenhower and Dulles. Members of both British and American governments pushed for Eden to approach the Security Council of the United Nations to have sanctions brought on Nasser, but he felt it would be useless. As Eden wrote in his memoirs, “The precedents were discouraging. … The Russians, who were the armers and backers of Colonel Nasser, had the power of veto in the Council and would not hesitate to use it.”\textsuperscript{29}

\textsuperscript{27} Eisenhower, \textit{Eisenhower Diaries}, 330.
\textsuperscript{28} Eden, 470.
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid., 475.
Almost a month after the nationalization occurred, both Eisenhower and Dulles approached Eden to hold a conference in London with representatives of country members of the 1888 Convention to discuss how Nasser had violated the treaty. The Eisenhower administration was not aware Eden was moving towards collusion “born of a marriage between [his] anti-Nasser policy and the unwritten anti-Nasser alliance of France and Israel.” After the nationalization, the U.S. questioned their relations with Nasser, and Eden hoped that with the conference, they would join his side and together remove Nasser. When the conference began in late August 1956, a solution for international operation of the canal was pronounced; and was sent to Nasser, who chose not to attend the conference. The committee officially sent Robert Menzies, the Prime Minister of Australia, to “put the demand for an international authority to Nasser—not to negotiate, simply to demand.” Throughout the London Conference, Dulles gave Eden the impression that Eisenhower and the U.S. would “be prepared to use force if all else failed.” Eden had very high hopes, based on the impressions he got from Dulles, because he knew that the Menzies Mission was doomed from the start.

30 The 1888 Convention, also called the Convention of Constantinople, was a treaty regarding passage through the Suez Canal. At the time, it guaranteed passage of all ships through the canal during wartime and peacetime. It was signed by the royal figures of the United Kingdom, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Russia, as well as the Emperor of the Ottoman Empire and the President of France. The countries that sent representatives to the London Conference consisted of: Australia, Britain, Ceylon, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, India, Indonesia, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Persia, Portugal, Sweden, and the United States. See Neff, Warriors at Suez, 296.


A week after the conference, President Eisenhower began a correspondence with Prime Minister Eden to discuss the Nasser issue. Unfortunately for Eden, it was not what he wanted to hear. As Eisenhower wrote on September 2,

I am afraid, Anthony, that from this point onward our views on this situation diverge. As to the use of force or the threat of force at this juncture. ... Even now military preparations and civilian evacuation exposed to public view seem to be solidifying support for Nasser which has been shaky in many import quarters. I regard it as indispensable that if we are to proceed solidly together to the solution of this problem, public opinion in our several countries must be overwhelming in its support. ... I really do not see how a successful result could be achieved by forcible means. The use of force would, it seems to me, vastly increase the area of jeopardy.  

Eden responded by explaining parallels between Nasser and Hitler’s tactics in WWII. Also, Eden hoped to “bring the Americans into line by parading the Communist bogey,” and detailing Soviet involvement with Egypt. He sent the following retort on September 6, one day before Menzies would be rejected by Nasser:

Similarly the seizure of the Suez Canal is, we are convinced, the opening gambit in a planned campaign designed by Nasser to expel all Western influence and interest from Arab countries. He believes that if he can get away with this, and if he can successfully defy eighteen nations, his prestige in Arabia will be so great that he will be able to mount revolutions of


young officers in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq. ... These new governments will in effect be Egyptian satellites if not Russian ones.  

Eden hoped this would be enough to persuade Eisenhower that Nasser would plunge the world into war and back whatever Britain’s next plans were. Eisenhower sent a response the day after Menzies failed to convert Nasser:

The use of military force against Egypt under present circumstances might have consequences even more serious than causing the Arabs to support Nasser. It might cause a serious misunderstanding between our two countries because I must say frankly that there is as yet no public opinion in this country which is prepare to support such a move, and the most significant public opinion that there is seems to think that the United Nations was formed to prevent this very thing.  

With the combination of the Baghdad Pact, Aswan Dam, the failure of the London Conference, and the subsequent correspondence with Eisenhower, Eden felt he had enough motives to abandon the U.S. and move into collusion with France and Israel.

The new alliance had already devised a plan to deal with Egypt. The strategy involved Israel instigating a fight on the Suez Canal, leading Nasser to retaliate, and Britain and France entering the fight to protect their assets. With this new association, Eden wanted to keep Eisenhower and Dulles out of the loop. As Anthony Nutting, the Minister of State for

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36 Eden, 519-520.
37 Eisenhower, The Middle Way, 2275.
Foreign Affairs, articulated Eden took “the most elaborate precautions” in order to keep his allies, especially the U.S., from learning of his new association.\(^{38}\) As the Crisis exploded in late October, the British government was appalled at Eden’s decision and asked why the Americans were not involved. Eden’s response on October 31 explains why the U.S. had no involvement with the Crisis:

> It is obvious truth that safety of transit through the canal, though clearly of concern to the United States, is for them not a matter of survival as it is to us and, indeed, to all Europe, and many other lands. ... Of course that is true. We must all accept it, and we should not complain about it, but it is equally true that throughout all these months this fact has inevitably influenced the attitude of the United States to these problems, as compared to that of ourselves and France. If anyone says that on account we should have held up action until agreement could be reached with the United States as to what to do, I can only say that this would have been to ignore what everyone here and in the United States knows to have been different approaches to some of these vital Middle East questions. They know it. We know it. Of course, we deplore it, but I do not think that it can carry with it this corollary, that we must in all circumstances secure agreement from our American ally before we can act ourselves in what we know to be our own vital interests.\(^{39}\)

However, what Eden had not thought of nor prepared for was the “prompt and thoroughgoing [of] an American effort to halt the attack before it had succeeded.”\(^{40}\)

\(^{38}\) Nutting, 110.  
\(^{39}\) Eden, 595-596.  
While the collusion formed behind their backs, Dulles heard rumors regarding British secret action on the Suez Canal. These rumors worried the U.S., and forced Dulles to call for a second London Conference, where he formed the Suez Canal Users Association (SCUA). Similar to the first London Conference, the SCUA hoped to motivate users of the Suez Canal to remove Nasser’s hand and reclaim control of the canal. Eden and French Prime Minister Guy Mollet saw this new union as a “Trojan Horse:” send a ship through the canal, let it be denied by Nasser, charge Egypt with violating the 1888 convention, and take violent actions. After realizing that Eden took his plan and twisted it in a different direction, Dulles took to the press to mention that the SCUA would not condone any use of force whatsoever. After reading the transcript of Dulles’ comments, Eden was angered and flung the paper at Nutting, who happened to be at 10 Downing Street when Eden received the transcript. The Americans had blocked Eden again from his plans for the Suez Canal.

On October 29, Israeli forces began the invasion of Egypt, and the following day Britain and France issued ultimatums to Egypt and Israel to cease fighting at once. When the demands were not answered, Britain and France began bombing. Eisenhower—who was on the final stretch of his reelection campaign and dealing with a revolution against the Soviet Union in Hungary—learned of Israel’s invasion and knew it was only a matter of time before his closest

41 Childers, 223-224.
42 Neff, 320.
43 Nutting, 70.
ally began to impose his will on Nasser. In a conversation with Dulles, Eisenhower shouted, “Foster, you tell them, Goddamnit, that we’re going to apply sanctions, we’re going to the United Nations, we’re going to do everything that there is so we can stop this thing.” 44 The U.S. officially spearheaded the United Nations intervention in Egypt when Dulles submitted the cease-fire resolutions on November 1. 45

The three nations ignored the cease-fire, and Eisenhower realized he needed something more and decided oil was the proper way to go. On the same day Dulles submitted the cease-fire proposal, a Syrian Army destroyed pipelines and pumping stations carrying Iraqi oil to the Mediterranean. 46 Eisenhower understood that Britain would be desperate for oil because of this loss, and elected to cut them off from American oil. After speaking with Defense Mobilization Director Arthur Flemming, he decided that “those who began this operation should be left to work out their own oil problems—to boil in their own oil.” 47 Britain was in a bind, as Nutting explained, “In the previous two months a run on the pound in the world’s financial markets threatened seriously to deplete Britain’s dollar reserves. Without credits from the United States, we should therefore be unable to buy the oil we needed.” 48 Having to begin rationing oil for the first time since WWII, Eden accepted the cease-fire and removed British troops from Egypt. Once this

44 Quoted in Smith, 697.
45 Ibid., 698.
46 Ibid.
47 Quoted in Ibid., 697.
48 Nutting, 133.
happened, Eisenhower began to sell oil to Britain.\footnote{Ibid., 156.}

Following the immediate aftermath of the Suez Crisis, Eisenhower and the U.S. capitalized on their aspirations for the Middle East from before the crisis. After Britain and France removed themselves, they left a power vacuum in the region and Eisenhower seized the position.\footnote{Childers, 306.} Eisenhower wrote three measures and ways to appease both Egypt and Israel in order to expel Soviet influence from the area:

Measures to be taken under these elements would be: (1) rapid restoration of pipeline and canal operation. This might have to be done almost wholly by American technical groups, but I should think that we might also mobilize some people from Germany and Italy. This work should begin instantly. (2) Push negotiations under the United Nations so as to prevent renewed outbreak of difficulty; and (3) provide to the area, wherever necessary, surplus foods, and so on, to prevent suffering. … We must make certain that every weak country understand what can be in store for it once it falls under the domination of the Soviets. … For example, we can provide Egypt with an agreed upon amount of arms—sufficient to maintain internal order and a reasonable defense of its borders, in return for an agreement that it will never accept any Soviet offer. … We could make some kind of arms agreement—particularly maintenance and training—with Israel of exactly the same type we would make with Egypt.\footnote{Eisenhower, Eisenhower Diaries, 334.}

These measures and ideas gave credence to a doctrine he was working on to be presented to the U.S. Congress a few months later. The Eisenhower Doctrine stated that any country in need of economic or military assistance following

\footnote{Ibid., 156.}
\footnote{Childers, 306.}
\footnote{Eisenhower, Eisenhower Diaries, 334.}
the attack from another nation could approach the U.S. for help. Eisenhower also kept his desire to connect religiously with the Arab nations alive through the doctrine. Months after the conception of the doctrine, Eisenhower gave an address at the dedication of the new Islamic Center in Washington, where he called for “the peaceful progress of all men under one God,” essentially saying that regardless of religious differences, we can be allies.  

While Eisenhower turned the Suez Crisis into a success for the U.S., Eden took a beating in Britain. Public opinion of the Prime Minister was already rocky, and during the Suez Crisis opinions plummeted. Many members of Parliament and newspapers called for the resignation of Eden. They received their wish a few months after the crisis; Eden announced his resignation suddenly in early January. Eden said, in great sorrow, that “the life at Westminster in these days is a strenuous one, for which I clearly have not the present health.” He left in “ill-health aggravated by the bitter national controversy and the dissensions in his own party arising from the Government’s decision on armed intervention in Egypt.” Anglo-American relations remained strained after the resignation of Eden; however, in February of 1957, Eisenhower allowed “informal talks” between himself and new Secretary of State for Defense, Duncan Sandys, the first talks between America and Britain “after the strained

52 Inboden, 291.
53 “Prime Minister Must Resign” Times (London), 5 November, 1956.
atmosphere of the Suez Crisis.”

The underlying theme of Anglo-American relations during the Suez Crisis was betrayal, and the supposed indestructible bond between the U.S. and Britain was strained. Both leaders had different desires for how to handle the growing issues in the Middle East, which led them to misrepresent and miscommunicate their goals. President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles had distorted their interests to Prime Minister Eden on more than one occasion, which led Eden to keep the collusion with France and Israel a secret from the U.S. Both leaders felt the other had betrayed their trust by false representation of their true intentions with the Middle East. The Suez Crisis was inadvertently born and grew out of miscommunication and resentment between Eisenhower, Dulles, and Eden.